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‘My passport is just my way out of here’.
Mixed-immigration status families, immigration
enforcement and the citizenship implications
Melanie Griﬃths
GEES (School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences), University of Birmingham,
Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
In a context of sustained political attempts to reduce immigration and increase
expulsions from the UK, mixed-immigration status relationships between citi-
zens and precarious foreign nationals have arisen as key sites where the
boundaries of national belonging are contested. These families are presented
as inherently problematic: complicating the citizen/migrant binary and suppo-
sedly pitting family life against national immigration objectives. Drawing on
the accounts of British female partners of ‘deportable’ men, the article exam-
ines the impact of immigration enforcement on the lives and senses of
security and membership of the citizens close to the migrants targeted. It
argues that the women discovered longstanding gendered and classed bar-
riers to operationalising their citizenship privileges, which led to reconﬁgura-
tions of their relationships with their government and understandings of the
institution of citizenship. Their accounts illustrate how immigration controls
produce and discipline citizens, as well as migrants, exposing the internal
hierarchies and conditionalities of citizenship.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 3 November 2017; Accepted 21 May 2019
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Introduction
“If you are a British citizen then falling in love with someone who is not British
isn’t allowed to happen basically.” (PB4)
Mixed-immigration status families are emerging as one of the most proble-
matised forms of intimacy in the UK and a key site for contestation over the
boundaries of belonging. Such families challenge normative and racialised
ideas about national identity, and the ability of states to control their
populations and borders. They elicit scrutiny of both the citizen and migrant
partners’ membership of the country and may be construed as being in
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direct conﬂict with national objectives. This article draws on qualitative
research conducted in 2015–16, in the run up to the UK’s EU referendum,
with couples consisting of ‘deportable’ migrant men and their British or EEA-
national wives and girlfriends.1 The focus here is on the British women and
the indirect impact of a partner’s immigration insecurity and enforcement,
arguing that these citizens’ experiences reﬂect increasingly restrictive immi-
gration policies, coupled with a long gendered, classed and racialised his-
tory of mistrust of cross-border intimacy, moral regulation of families and
hierarchisation of citizenship.
The article begins by considering the commonly-employed binary
between migrants and citizens, and the UK’s history of problematising
relationships between citizen women and outsider men. After introducing
the interviewees, the article discusses the impact of their partners’ immigra-
tion battles on the women’s own sense of stability and belonging in the UK.
I argue that struggles accessing their citizen privileges coupled with their
antagonistic experiences of the state undermined the British women’s sense
of belonging to the UK, illustrating the diﬀerentiated nature of citizenship.
The following sections consider the women’s changing relationship to the
state, feelings of nationhood and understanding of citizenship, including
considering their articulations of claims to rights. By recognising that immi-
gration systems also profoundly aﬀect citizens, we gain insight into the
relational and diﬀerentiated nature of citizenship, as well as the role of
immigration controls in constructing and disciplining both migrants and
citizens.
Theoretical and legislative context
In theory, migrants and citizens are mutually exclusive categories, with the
rights and restrictions of one deﬁning the other. The liability of foreigners to
exceptional measures, such as forced destitution, detention and emoval, (re)
inscribes the insider/outside distinction by demonstrating the contingency of
migrants, as well as the privileges of citizenship, such as protection from
immigration control and excessive state interference, and the rights to enter
and remain in the country (De Genova and Peutz 2010; Walters 2002). In
practice, however, the distinctions are blurred and contested. ‘Foreigners’
may be ‘almost-citizens’, such as non-citizens with normative claims to belong
through length of residence or connections to nationals (or pre-Brexit EEA
nationals exercising freedom of movement). Conversely, British citizens are
sometimes subject to UK immigration controls or forced (im)mobility, both
through error and on exceptional grounds,2 as well increasingly being subject
to immigration checks, including in the workplace and interactions with state
services. British citizenship is becoming less an irrevocable right than an
insubstantial privilege conditional on self-reliance and good behaviour
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(Gibney 2011, 4). Rarely-used denaturalisation powers have also been
revamped, stripping citizenship from growing numbers of people, including
British-born and single nationals.3
In parallel, the political austerity agenda has resulted in signiﬁcantly rising
poverty and destitution rates of Britons; undermining the promises of
citizenship and demonstrating the role of wealth and welfare in maintaining
its internal hierarchies. Overlapping membership and treatment of ‘illegal
immigrants’ and denigrated citizens, such as the demonised ‘beneﬁt scroun-
ger’, reﬂects their common origin, which in the UK were the ‘vagrants’ and
‘masterless men’ of the 14th century. Their ‘problematic’ mobility was con-
trolled through legislation; from the landless labourers compelled to be
mobile for work, to the creation of the ‘settled poor’ whose access to poor
relief required remaining in their parish (Anderson 2013). Contemporary
‘failed’ citizens are disciplined in ways similar to unwanted migrants: judged
as unskilled, idle, dependent, uncivilised, irresponsible, threatening ‘our’
values and raising problem families. Indeed, moralising assessments of the
form and quality of family life is as critical to claims for welfare as challenges
to deportation.
Before the Aliens Act 1793, there was little distinction in the UK between
foreigners and citizens. They have since grown into (supposedly) mutually-
exclusive categories, although are regulated and hierarchised through similar
techniques focused on mobility, criminalisation, labour and the family. As
‘migrants’ and ‘citizens’ separated as categories, policing them and the relation-
ships between them became critical to deﬁning the nation (Anthias and Yuval-
Davis 1989; Bonjour and De Hart 2013; Charsley and Benson 2012). Colonial
artefacts like household manuals and marriage bans, for example, illustrate
a long history of British state attempts to regulate their proximity, particularly
intimacy between white British women and colonised men.
Concerns that (certain) families challenge notions of the nation coloured the
development of immigration controls in the 20th century. Immigration systems
operate through gendered, racialised and classed rhetoric (Bonjour and
Duyvendak 2018; Griﬃths 2015, 2017a; Scheibelhofer 2012, and discrimination
was evident – often explicitly so – in the UK’s immigration system during
the second half of the century (Smith 2014). Although family reuniﬁcation
was initially valued for aiding integration, the arrival of ethnic minority spouses
led to growing political concern about ﬂows of non-white entrants and ‘chain
migration’ (Wray 2012). Family migration became seen as a ‘loophole’ through
which a potentially endless number of unwanted outsiders could arrive. With
men considered inherently economically-motivated and women led by emo-
tion, there was concern that foreign husbands, especially racialised men from
former colonies, were male labour migrants in disguise, which resulted in
a series of policies designed to bar foreign husbands, especially those from
the Indian sub-continent (Wray 2012).4
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Just as with the ‘migrant’ category, and despite the notional equality of
citizenship, membership to the nation is racialised, gendered, classed and
cultured (Isin 1999; Shaﬁr 1998; Stevenson 2001; Yuval-Davis 2011; Yuval-
Davis and Werbner 1999). ‘Good’ citizens are construed as self-suﬃcient and
living within their means, whilst second class ‘abject’, or ‘failed’, citizens,
such as the poor or criminalised, are deemed to have questionable character
and belonging (Sirriyeh 2015; Tyler 2013). The institution of British citizen-
ship is founded upon ‘state racism’, with its roots in the colonial system5 and
construction of a nationality system designed to exclude and marginalise
certain people (Paul 1997; Tyler 2010). The legacy of Empire remains evident
in the multitude of legal forms of British belonging,6 created to maintain an
indivisible British subjecthood but resulting in a (racialised) system selec-
tively managing the mobility of diﬀerent groups (Hansen 2000). The devel-
opment of a British national identity was not only challenged by the
spreading independence of colonies, however, but also by women ﬁghting
for their own nationality rights (Baldwin 2001).
Women have historically been considered weak citizens, despite being
framed as reproducers of the nation (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1989), with
the ‘good citizen’ liberal ideal being an industrious, self-controlled, hard-
working property-owning male, excluding women as naturally unﬁt for
citizenship as a result of their (supposed) dependency, irrationality and
lack of control over their bodies and labour (Anderson 2013, 96; Brace
2004). The framing of women as lesser citizens is reﬂected in British immi-
gration and nationality legislation, which historically has assumed women to
be passive and emotional creatures who don’t make decisions, are easily
fooled, led by feelings and whose identity, nationality and loyalty derive
from fathers and husbands (Wray 2012). Women in the UK could only
reproduce the nation on behalf of their husbands (Klug 1989); they did
not have independent national belonging and attachment to foreign part-
ners cast further doubt over their allegiance. The Naturalisation Act 1844
denied women the right to confer their nationality to foreign spouses, even
though foreign-born women marrying British men had automatic access to
citizenship. From 1870, women lost their nationality and automatic right to
enter the UK if they ‘deliberately married an alien’ or their British husband
renounced his nationality (Carver 2016). It was not until 1948 that British
women could retain their nationality independently of their husbands, and
only since 1983 that they could transmit it to their children.
Contemporary immigration legislation continues to reﬂect these biases
and it remains the case that Britons’ ability to exercise their citizenship, such
as marry and live with the person of their choice, is gendered, as well as
classed and racialised. The 2012 family migration rule changes, for example,
more than tripled the minimum income threshold for spousal visas, placing
it well above the minimum wage. Nearly half the UK’s population does not
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earn enough to sponsor a foreign spouse, with wage disparities, employ-
ment rates and care duties meaning that certain groups, like women and
ethnic minorities, are particularly aﬀected (Sirreyeh 2015; The Migration
Observatory 2014). Citizen women are still deemed to need protection
from foreign tricksters (reﬂected in ‘sham marriage’ discourses (De Hart
2006; Wray 2006)), and the vast majority of those rejected and expelled
from the country continues to be black and minority ethnicity men.7
Interviewees
To explore the lived reality of these issues and the implications for British
belonging, this article draws on qualitative research conducted in 2014–17
on the family lives of UK-based men at risk of enforced removal.8 Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 30 mixed-immigration status
couples, with additional research including policy and media analysis, obser-
vation of deportation appeals and immigration hearings, and interviews of
practitioners working in the state, civil society, private and legal sectors,
including inspectors of the immigration, prison and detention systems,
a former senior manager of an Immigration Removal Centre, marriage
registrars, immigration lawyers and NGO representatives. This article focuses
on a subset of interviews conducted with eleven British women whose
boyfriends or husbands faced possible forcible removal from the country,
potentially permanently, as a result of their insecure presence. Names and
identifying information have been changed.
The womenwere all born into British citizenship andwere aged 20–40 years.
They were predominantly Caucasian and Christian or atheist, with one Afro-
Caribbeanwoman and oneMuslim convert. The women diﬀered signiﬁcantly in
terms of their socio-economic positions, prior knowledge of immigration mat-
ters and previous experience of state intrusion. Some were fulltime mothers,
out of work, unable to work or only working part-time, others worked in health
or education, or had oﬃce-based or retail jobs. There were homeowners and
professionals, as well as women with entrenched disadvantage and precarious
housing and income. Eight of the eleven had children with their non-citizen
partner (half were planned), seven were married. Most felt isolated in ﬁghting
for their partners’ presence in the UK and bemoaned a lack of understanding
from friends and family. They sought help by hiring lawyers, if they could aﬀord
it, and contacting their local MPs, who were often unsupportive. A handful set-
up online petitions or sought local media interest, but these were often met
with xenophobic and misogynistic trolling, as did attempts by the most under-
privileged women to raise legal funds through online raﬄes and crowdsource
funding. They did not lobby collectively, although a couple aligned themselves
to groups lobbying on the related (but far less stigmatised) issue of the spousal
visa minimum income threshold.
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The women’s partners all had uncertain futures, and precarious immigra-
tion statuses, in the UK, but occupied various legal positions. They included
visa overstayers, asylum seekers, foreign national oﬀenders, illegal entrants,
long-term residents and non-citizens on temporary visas. They had been in
the UK anywhere between a few months and a couple of decades, with
three having been in the UK since they were teenagers. Four had previously
been forcibly removed from the UK (two had since returned, one illegally),
the others knew this might be their fate. Two had been in British prisons,
three in immigration detention. They had diverse nationalities, originating
from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the USA and Europe (e.g. Armenia, Albania).
One couple met gaming online, four met overseas whilst the women were
travelling or working, and the rest met in the UK, usually when the men
were already precariously present. Most of the couples were mired in long
legal battles with the Home Oﬃce and/or stuck in irregular or precarious
limbo in the UK, with a few already separated by the immigration system or
living together outside of the country.
Repercussions and shaken security
The women and their children were evidently harmed by the immigration
system, even though, as citizens, they were not subject to immigration
controls. Their plans, dreams, education, employment, family planning,
social mobility and physical, mental and economic wellbeing were aﬀected
by their partners’ immigration status and the stress and costs of possible
separation. The immigration struggles damaged relationships (between
partners, but also parents and children), shaped decisions regarding mar-
riage, cohabitation and conception, made people resort to medication and
aﬀected their personalities (‘It’s made me a very nervous person . . . I’m
completely diﬀerent now. It’s changed me’ (PB21)). The women were
made poorer, as they lost savings and became indebted by legal and
application fees, costs of visits to partners in prison, immigration detention
or overseas, and compensating for their partners’ forced unemployment.
Separation and ﬁnancial pressures forced them into work (including working
excessive hours/days, multiple jobs, sacriﬁcing maternity leave), or out of
employment, sometimes pushing them onto state support for the ﬁrst time.
Changed marital status aﬀected their welfare beneﬁts, even when their
husbands could neither work nor access welfare in the UK, with some forced
to rely on Crisis Loans, food banks or appealing on social media for baby
milk (‘I am selling up every single piece of thing that I own so that I can be
with the man I love. I have lost everything’. (PB4)).
The women invariably described feeling powerless and immobile: stuck
spatially, socially and temporally. They were unable to envisage, trust in or
plan for a future (‘We can’t just do what we want. You can’t live the life that
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you want to live, you can’t do anything’. (PB30)). Such uncertainty was
particularly pronounced in relation to immigration detention or deportation
(‘I can’t plan too far ahead, because what if he’s deported?’, ‘When some-
body passes away you can gradually let them go, but when somebody is still
alive and you are stuck in limbo waiting for them to get a release date, or
get sent home, or get sent back . . . ’). Living under extreme insecurity might
continue for years, including after receiving a visa, which are often tempor-
ary or probationary. Coupled with frequently changing rules, the risks of
losing one’s status/citizenship and long-term emotional scars from living in
immigration illegality, means that even indeﬁnite leave to remain ‘feels like
it’s temporary’ to an interviewee whose husband was a long-term visa
overstayer. Another woman successfully obtained a spousal visa for her
husband, but as it initially only lasts 33 months, her income must remain
high and she says that during that time, ‘I will not rest and I will not relax. It
doesn’t feel permanent to me yet, it feels like he’s just here on a really long
trip’, explaining they live ‘each day as they come’ because ‘we just don’t
know when it’s going to be taken away’. (PB21).
These feelings of insecurity and suspension, of being stuck living with
profound powerlessness and uncertainty, for unknown, indeﬁnite but often
lengthy periods, are strikingly reminiscent of the experiences of irregular
migrants, refused asylum seekers and immigration detainees (e.g. Griﬃths
2014; Mountz 2011). The citizens spoke of feeling trapped as a ‘prisoner of
the situation’, unable to ‘move forwards’, control their lives or predict even
the short-term future (‘How long are we going to wait for? What am I going
to do with my life? I’ll have to wait and see’. (PB30)). They grappled with
similar experiences of liminality and insecurity over their place in space and
time as their non-citizen partners. One woman, for example, complained
that powerlessness over her husband’s imminent but unpredictable depar-
ture from the UK means that they are trapped in the immediate present.
Stuck in a ‘limbo of not being able to plan anything at all’, they live with
their suitcases packed, ‘always being ready to leave’.
Like this woman, many of the citizens were (usually very reluctantly)
entertaining the possibility of leaving the UK because of their partner.
British women no longer lose their nationality upon marrying a foreigner,
but they may nonetheless be forced out of the country. Some were explicitly
advised by the Home Oﬃce to consider relocating their family abroad, whilst
other were planning ‘voluntary exile’ in order to keep their family together9
or in disgust at the UK (‘Why would I want to stay in this shitty, miserable
country? If my Great British government don’t want him to be here with me,
then stuﬀ them. I’m not going to be here, I’m going to leave’. (PB4)). Some
were planning moves to countries that they considered violent or danger-
ous, including Jamaica and Afghanistan, some sold their possessions, lost
accommodation and jobs, or were separated from friends and families
IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUDIES IN CULTURE AND POWER 7
(including children from previous relationships) in the process. Having to
leave the UK in order to live with their partner shook the women’s ideas
about their rights, security and expectations of citizenship. ‘It’s just so wrong
on every level. To say that you can have your family somewhere else, I mean
that’s just ridiculous. Why should I have to go and live somewhere else? I’m
entitled to live here, why should I have to go and move my family half way
round the world in order to have a family together?’ (PB27). Another
complained, ‘I’m a British Citizen, why do I need to get up? We’ve been
married for ﬁve years, we’ve got two children together. That’s just mad,
I was born here!’ (PB45)).
The women also reported feeling insecure and afraid as a result of the
UK’s increasingly hostile immigration climate, despite their personal exemp-
tion from immigration controls. Internalising fears intended for others, one
citizen watches the TV program Border Force and warns that at any time
‘they can walk in a shop and start checking everyone!’ Another describes
‘freaking out’ when her husband receives oﬃcial letters and another strug-
gles with chronic anxiety knowing that ‘they’ could arrive for her husband at
any time. A woman whose partner was detained for years panics when she
sees immigration vans, fearing ‘they’re going to be there waiting to take
him’, and frets during his weekly report to the police (‘I’m panicking, I’m like
why hasn’t he answered, what’s going on, has he gone?’). Another woman
fears that if she ever managed to bring to her partner to the UK, he would
be ‘at the mercy’ of the authorities and she would be unable to ‘protect’
him: ‘That frightens me more than never seeing him again . . . I am so scared
that he would get dragged away in the middle of the night, put in detention
and die there’. One interviewee is so afraid of immigration checks and
queries of their relationship, that she takes their marriage certiﬁcate when
they travel and even within the UK, ‘if I’m with my husband, we carry the
passports at all times, because you can be stopped at any time . . . I fear that
they’ll pull him in if I don’t have it with me’. (PB21). Despite no one being
required to carry identiﬁcation in the UK, this British-born citizen now carries
her passport with her, out of fear of immigration patrols. For all the women,
their partners’ immigration precarity undermined their own sense of security
of belonging and privilege as citizens, demonstrating the relational nature
of citizenship and centrality of family life to it.
Relationship to the state
The women’s relationship to the state was transformed by being trapped in
lengthy and insecure liminality, by their antagonistic struggles with the
Home Oﬃce and by being advised by oﬃcials to leave the UK. They felt
betrayed at what was experienced as high levels of state-sponsored emo-
tional and ﬁnancial harm caused to themselves and their families (‘It is like
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your heart has been ripped out of your chest and thrown on the ﬂoor and
stamped on by the British Government’. (PB4)). The women felt unimportant
to politicians (‘I don’t see them ever doing anything [just] because I’m
a British citizen. I don’t really think I’m counted in any of this . . . Why
would they be interested in one small little person?’ (PB30)). They felt let
down and dismissed (‘It feels like a rejection’, ‘It feels like betrayal basically’),
with their rights as citizens not considered, and their lives, decisions and
children not valued. At being told to move overseas if she and her children
wished to live with their father, one interviewee queried ‘why does my
government feel like that, when I’m an asset to them?’ (PB7).
Most of the citizens, particularly those hitherto shielded from state scru-
tiny and interference by class privilege, also struggled with the level of
oﬃcial intrusion and disbelief they experienced and many had accounts of
judgement and humiliation by immigration actors. One British interviewee,
for example, had been repeatedly and publically embarrassed by UK border
guards, including having the paternity of her baby questioned (‘that
oﬀended me. That’s really oﬀensive’). The ﬁrst time was when her husband
arrived on a hard-won spousal visa a few days after their baby was born
(after a complicated labour that she had gone through alone because of
delays processing his visa). Despite arriving legally and properly, he was
interrogated for hours at the airport, with his wife left waiting in Arrivals
anxiously breastfeeding their baby until he was ﬁnally let through at 1am,
too angry to celebrate meeting his newborn. The second border humiliation
was a few weeks later, upon returning from their ﬁrst family holiday. UK
border oﬃcials apparently questioned why she hadn’t changed her surname
upon marriage (she isn’t obliged to) and requested proof of paternity and
the baby’s birth certiﬁcate. When she objected, ‘the guy went into his pram,
and went: “Don’t look like him much”’, noting that the baby’s skin and eyes
were lighter than his father’s. She exclaims, ‘I’ve never felt so oﬀended, or to
be made to feel like a criminal in my life! In my own country!’ They continue
to experience problems at the UK border and so she sacriﬁces part of her
citizenship privileges, to go through the ‘all other passports queue, and go
together’.
Such treatment undermined the women’s trust in the state (‘I’ve lost all faith
in my government, how they treat us. How can my government do this to me?’
(PB4)), which was made worse by decision-making that appeared unfair, irra-
tional and incoherent. Several described the immigration system as
‘Kafkaesque’ and contradictory. For example, although being unmarried was
a disadvantage in operationalising citizenship privileges for one’s foreign
spouse, those that were married found that the authorities often cheapened,
dismissed or even penalised their unions, including through accusations of .
‘sham’ motives, undervaluing Islamic marriages and by handicapping those
marrying on the wrong visa. The most socio-economically marginalised citizens
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found it hard tomarry at all, with local authorities threatening reduction of their
accommodation and beneﬁts if they married. These adversarial and incoherent
state responses were made worse by the women’s inability to see any purpose
to excluding their partner (‘I don’t knowwhat the point is. It’s not going to help
anybody, is it?’), highlighting the costs to the state of producing single-parent
households and forcing citizens out of work. The strength and length of the
authorities’ ﬁght felt insultingly disproportionate to their modest demands: ‘It is
not like I am asking to be crowned Queen of England. I am only asking to be
allowed to get married and have my child’s father around! That should be
something that I can realistically expect’. (PB37).
For some, the experiences did not only shake their faith in the authorities,
but actively pitted them against each other (‘I’ve fought the English govern-
ment. I’ve fought the Home Oﬃce’. (PB4)). For the women with pre-existing
strained relations with the authorities as the result of previous interactions
(e.g. around welfare access) or political ideology, it deepened their discon-
tent (‘I’ve always hated the British government, I just hate it more now’
(PB8), ‘Every single bit of pride that I had to be calling myself a British citizen
has almost gone out of the window . . . they have basically sucked every
single bit of love for the UK out of me’. (PB4)). It even encouraged some to
undermine the border controls being enacted in their name. One profes-
sional woman regretted cooperating with the authorities after their heavy-
handed and publicly humiliating treatment of her husband, including hand-
cuﬃng him in front of their child, concluding: ‘we should never have sent
him back, we should have just waited ten years with him undocumented’.
Another interviewee spent time in Calais with her husband after he was
removed and helped him smuggle himself back to the UK illegally.
The citizens’ expectations and reactions to the Home Oﬃce were
coloured by class, ﬁnancial (in)security and prior experience of the state,
particularly of the criminal justice and welfare systems. For the more privi-
leged citizens, the immigration battles and associated intrusion, harm and
humiliation were shocking and soured relationships with the state that had
been previously positive. Even those who knew through work or volunteer-
ing that the Home Oﬃce could treat migrants very poorly, still expected that
their personal involvement as ‘good’ citizens would guarantee good treat-
ment and positive resolution in their own cases. One professional assumed
that her identity as ‘a white, middle-class doctor’ would resolve the intract-
able immigration situation of her refused asylum-seeking husband, despite
all she knew of the immigration system (‘I’m not saying that’s how it should
be, or that I should expect preferential treatment [but] I did somehow think
that was how it was going to be . . . ’). She admitted naively trusting that ‘it
will obviously be sorted out in about three weeks. It’ll be ﬁne. I can pay for
the lawyer that we want, and I can write my letters, and I’ve shown my
doctor’s certiﬁcate, and they’ll obviously just put it straight through’. Having
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always ‘thought the state as a kind of organisation that was something that
was generally there to be helpful and supportive and not something that I,
personally, would ever have to be ﬁghting with’, she reports a new sense of
mistrust and abandonment borne from her direct experience and inability to
operationalise or bestow her citizenship privileges.
Citizenship and belonging
All the interviewees reported that their British citizenship felt less valuable as
a result of their family’s experiences. They spoke of feeling prevented from
‘practicingmy citizenship’ and newly rejected and estranged, no longer ‘proud’
of being British or willing to engage in rituals of nationhood (‘I wouldn’t sing
the [national] anthem, pledge allegiance to the Queen, Britain, democracy and
all its values. I’m in disgust with my government’ (PB8)). Some considered
renouncing their nationality (‘[if] I had to give up my citizenship I probably
would at this stage because I can’t see any advantage to even holding the
citizenship if I can’t get any of the beneﬁts’. (PB7), ‘I loved my country. But now
I feel like changing it. If they don’t want him here, ﬁne send him home [but] lose
a British citizen’ (PB4)). Others felt completely alienated from it (‘I just don’t feel
like one’ (PB45)), or claimed to have a narrowly ‘utilitarian attitude’ to citizen-
ship, reducing it to ‘a very powerful passport’ that was valued for enabling
escape from the UK (‘It’s not about feeling British, it’s just about making it easier
to travel’. (PB27), ‘I lovemy passport for one thing: it allowsme to leave to travel
away from a country that doesn’t feel like home no more’. (PB4)).
Alongside a distaste or alienation from British citizenship, however, the
interviewees also often presented a strong sense of national pride, fre-
quently making a distinction between the British government and British
people/land. These articulations of Britishness were often long and poetic,
drawing on a combination of quaint nostalgia and supposedly-British values
around multiculturalism, human rights and tolerance (sometimes presented
ironically or as having been ‘lost’). Imagery included green hills, traﬃc lights,
scones, rain and ‘the crazy British weather’, current and historical royalty,
queuing, manners, religious diversity, and ‘our humour, our cups of tea and
ﬁsh and chips’ (PB37). This patriotism was presented both to demonstrate
the degree of the shift of their loyalty, and to legitimise their current
disillusionment, with those expressing strongest antipathy to the UK also
stressing their previously ﬁerce loyalty (‘I was one of these crazy England
fanatics [before], at every England football match. I would be out there in
my England t-shirt and put my England ﬂags all over my house’ (PB4)).
Reﬂecting their vulnerability to accusations of failure and disloyalty, the
women strove to emphasis their membership, including by scape-goating
others and distancing themselves from ‘failed’ citizens. They did so through
the discourse of citizenship, claiming unambiguous membership through
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birthright (‘I was born here, I was bred here. I am 100%, fully British’), some-
times referring to ancestry (‘I’m a British citizen whose ancestry stems back to
the Celts!’) or military connections (‘I am British and my father has served in the
Armed Services’). They appealed to ideals of work and paying tax to stress the
worthiness of both themselves (‘I’m a hardworking woman, I’ve worked since
I was 15ʹ (PB21)), and their partners (‘He has paid tax to this damned country
and yet they still do this’ (PB4)).10 Unemployed interviewees, at risk of slipping
into the demonised ‘beneﬁt scrounger’ ﬁgure, were at pains to justify their
receipt of welfare and claim good standing (‘I’ve never claimed a beneﬁt until
my son was born, because he is entitled, it’s his money. But I’ve never claimed
anything in my life’ (PB21), ‘This is economy is not functioning whatsoever. Why
should someone like me be on beneﬁts?’ (PB37)).
Denigrated groups often try to strengthen their own position by dissociating
themselves from each other (Anderson 2013, 6). Some interviewees positioned
themselves against other ethnicities or migrant categories seen as being
treated preferentially and/or abusing the system. The primary scapegoats,
however, were ‘failed’ citizens and the emerging scapegoat: E.U. citizens. The
former were occasionally ‘criminals’ but predominantly ‘beneﬁt scroungers’
criticised as immoral, lazy and/or unfairly gaining immigration advantage
through income threshold exemptions. The interviews, conducted in the year
leading up to the UK’s 2016 E.U. membership referendum, show striking and
widespread resentment against E.U. citizens in the UK for being able to by-pass
British immigration rules on sponsoring foreign spouses. Some, particularly
poorer interviewees, hardest hit by the spousal visa minimum income thresh-
old, were palpably angry at the apparent discrepancy (‘Why [do] I, a British
citizen, have to earn £18,600 a year whilst an E.U. member can just waltz into
England and bring their spouse here basically for free? Where the fuck are my
rights?’ (PB4)), with a couple stating that they would vote to leave in the
upcoming referendum.
Hierarchies of equality
Equality may be central to the theory of citizenship, but in practice it is an
ambiguous, contested and inconsistent status, with the ideal ‘good citizen’ –
the rational, independent, loyal, sovereign individual – heavily classed, gendered
and racialised (Anderson 2013; Yuval-Davis 2011). The women’s attachment to
a ‘undesirable’ precariously-present foreign man exposed these internal hierar-
chies and reconﬁgured and weakened their citizenship privileges. In addition to
their love choices, they identiﬁed two primary grounds uponwhich their claim to
full citizenship felt undermined: gender and money.11 Some considered the
dismissal of their family life to be misogynistic and xenophobic, with one inter-
viewee suggesting that government decisionmakers ‘think that English women,
or western women, who get with foreign men are a bit desperate . . . They think
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you are stupid, that you are desperate or you are a failure in your own country and
that is why you want a foreign partner’, with older women judged as ‘just a fool’.
(PB37). Many felt infantilised and patronised, as though they were not rational,
sovereign decision-makers (‘[they’re] treating us like we’re children, like we don’t
know what’s best for us’ (PB27), ‘They should be trusting me to make my own
decisions. I am a British citizen’. (PB37)). There was an element of forcible protec-
tion through state paternalism, particularly around deportingmale family ﬁgures
and ‘shammarriage’ accusations. A protective role was evident amongst the two
marriage registrars interviewed, who described intervening in possible marriages
of convenience as being ‘for her beneﬁt’, calling the brides ‘very vulnerable’, even
‘really, really quite wretched’, with examples given of ‘girls’ who were orphans,
had learning diﬃculties or were ‘very lowly paid’. They oﬀered moving – even
tragic – cases of ‘vulnerable’womenbeing ‘used’ and ‘preyed upon’ by foreigners
for immigration gain, and were motivated by ‘trying to save her’.12
The British immigration system explicitly favours richer over poorer migrants
(Bowling 2013).13 The new spousal visa income threshold and the experiences
of those interviewed for this research show that it also favours wealthier citizens
(which in turn is coloured by intersectional factors). The women’s ability to
navigate the immigration system for their partners depended upon their
ﬁnancial security (steady income, savings, childcare possibilities, job opportu-
nities, wealthy family), not just for applications and legal advice, but also to be
able to be ﬂexible and take risks, such as temporary relocation. Money is not
suﬃcient in itself, with even ﬁnancially-comfortable interviewees struggling,
but nonetheless they all felt ‘it comes down to money’, that ‘money talks to the
HomeOﬃce’ and that ‘cash, cold hard cash’was necessary. They talked of rights
increasingly being derived from wealth rather than nationality, and gave
examples of ‘the rich and famous’ receiving exemptions and preferential treat-
ment (‘if you can show you’re wealthy enough than it doesn’t seem to matter’).
‘Why is my government doing this to me? Because I’m poor?’ (PB4) asks one,
whilst another declares that, ‘they don’t want to catch people like them in the
net. They want to catch people like us’. (PB37)). One woman, noting that family
ties in the UK are increasingly derided as raising the risk of overstaying rather
than good grounds for a visa, sees the contemporary system as designed so
‘you can literally only come as a spending customer . . . a money spender’. She
saw her reliance onwelfare as bringing her into the state’s sight and preventing
her from performing her citizenship. After investing precious savings in arran-
ging marriage, including spending hundreds oﬃcially translating documents,
she cancelled lastminute after her local council rang to warn that a change in
marital status would threaten her housing and beneﬁts, even though her
husband would not be in the UK or entitled to work or beneﬁts. Prevented
from strengthening her immigration hand through marriage, she blames her
lack of ﬁnancial independence, ‘The only people whowould get inmy situation
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are poor people, because if you have got money you can aﬀord to get married
and have your partner without the government noticing you’. (PB37).
The most marginalised, those already vulnerable to ‘failed citizen’ stigma-
tisation through unemployment, absent co-parents or receipt of beneﬁts, were
least able to operationalise their citizenship privileges and felt the most
alienated from their citizenship. They pointed to a wider devaluing of citizen
rights through austerity, noting rising poverty, inequality, precarious working
and cuts to healthcare and welfare, but felt it was the additional factor of their
relationship to a precarious migrant that relegated them to, what one inter-
viewee described as, ‘outside society’. Prevented from achieving what she
called ‘normal’ goals, like marrying or living with her partner, this women
complained that she had not been warned she must ‘forfeit’ being British by
having ‘a foreign partner’. Already unable to exercise the substance of citizen-
ship, she worries she’ll lose it altogether one day. ‘My citizenship is at stake. Big
time’ she tells me, fearing that decision-makers now consider her
a problematic citizen: ‘If I was to end up in a court of law, my citizenship
would come into question. I feel like if I came in front of the law for any reason
I would be at risk of them saying, “That is fair enough, but you are not entitled
to this or that, these rights or those rights, because you’ve got a foreign
partner”’. (PB37)). She even fears that her (white, British-born, single nation-
ality) child’s membership is threatened, claiming that Conservative politicians
have said families involving a non-citizen ‘shouldn’t be classed as a British
family!’ She worries that one day the public will think that ‘the children of
foreign parents aren’t really British’ and her child might be ‘not welcome or
something’. Another woman said that her husband’s exclusion from the UK left
their ten-year-old without ‘any faith or trust in the government’, and that ‘he
doesn’t class himself as a British citizen’. These mothers worry about the future
implications of their children’s early civic disenfranchisement.
Conclusion
Far from being absolute, the line separating migrants from citizens is ﬂuid
and contested. Although in theory immigration systems help demarcate
such binaries, in practice immigration policies operate across the division,
with even ‘good’ citizens at risk of having their insider status queried
through intimate ties to an undesirable foreigner. Family migration, mixed-
immigration status families and family-based challenges to deportation
especially illuminate the intertwined nature of these categories and the
‘failed citizen’ and deportable migrant’s shared vulnerability to queried
belonging, character and worthiness. The research illustrates how exclusion-
ary border controls cause ﬁnancial, emotional and social harm to both
precarious migrants and the citizens close to them, with mixed families
living under chronic uncertainty and impermanence, and liable to being
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split up or advised to leave the UK. The – seemingly pointless and dispro-
portionate – state-sponsored harm to themselves and their families, and
their inability to operationalise or pass on their citizenship privileges, under-
mined the women’s sense of security and membership, denigrating their
relationship to the state, national identity and understanding of citizenship.
For these insiders, supposedly pitted against the ‘British tax payer’, immi-
gration controls expose the myth of inclusive and privileged citizenship, and
the importance of the family as a site of moral regulation.
The families live at a time of fundamental questioning of the UK’s
national identity and international relationships, as well as a policy context
in which signiﬁcant harm to both immigrants and ‘failed’ citizens is legit-
imised. Their experiences illuminate the internal hierarchies within citizen
(and migrant) categories and the increasing precarity and conditionality of
citizenship and access to rights (Sirreyeh 2015). They live with the legacy of
British women’s (and minority ethnic- and poorer- citizens’) weaker claims to
full allegiance and independent nationality, and the longstanding – racia-
lised, classed and gendered – problematisation of their intimacy with for-
eign men. State paternalism of citizen women remains evident, with oﬃcials
seeking to protect ‘vulnerable girls’ and ‘older fools’. There are echoes of the
suspicion that (racialised) husbands and fathers are economic migrants in
disguise, and that citizen women are disloyal, naive or foolish by marrying
outside the nation. Today’s immigration system is less overtly misogynistic
and xenophobic than it once was, but in practice British women in relation-
ships with ‘undesirable’ foreign men are still alienated from their citizenship
and made to choose between man and country. The most ﬁnancially-
marginalised citizens are most harmed and disaﬀected, feeling that the
membership of themselves and their children is in question.
The roots of citizenship in liberalism and individualism disadvantaged the
interviewees’ claims of national allegiance and ﬁtness for full inclusion on
mulitple grounds, including gender and class, with this worsening and being
worsened by, their attachment to a deportable man. All the women recog-
nised the centrality of ﬁnancial security and independence on their ability to
navigate the immigration system and operationalise citizenship privileges.
Those that could, asserted their rights through claiming an identity as
a ‘born and bred’ Briton and hardworking taxpayer: as skilled professionals
or employers working multiple jobs and excessive hours, sacriﬁcing mater-
nity leave and delaying children to be self-reliant. Those ‘failed’ citizens,
already struggling to live up to liberal ideals, were not only least able to
secure their partners’ security, but further marginalised through association
with an undesirable foreign national. Living at the intersect of citizenship,
immigration, family and welfare discourses, mixed-immigration status
families illustrate the ongoing role of the family in constructing the nation
and ‘good’ citizen and migrant, as well as the role of immigration policies in
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creating and disciplining both foreign nationals and citizens. As one inter-
viewee observed, the UK’s immigration system is an ‘attack on the poor as
much as the foreign’ (PB37).
Notes
1. I use ‘deportable’ to refer to non-citizens with irregular, limited or precarious
immigration status in the UK, placing them at risk of enforced removal. The
women’s British or EEA nationalities exempted them from immigration con-
trols at the time of research, although the status of EU citizens has subse-
quently been thrown into question by Brexit.
2. E.g. extradition, citizen minors deported with non-citizen parents, re-entry bans
of citizen terror suspects under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.
3. Just 10 denaturalisations occurred in 1949–2000 (on grounds relating to
character, national security, disloyalty and fraud) (Gibney 2011, 16). The ﬁgure
is now roughly 20 a year and is being used in growing numbers in response to
Britons joining ISIS in Syria: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/
318785/response/827666/attach/3/CCWD%20FOI%2038734%20Final%
20Response.pdf.
4. e.g. the Primary Purpose Rule (1985–1997), which required foreign spouses to
immigrate solely for relationship reasons and was aimed at diﬀerentiating
between intra- and inter-ethnic marriages.
5. A legal deﬁnition of British nationality was only created in 1914 (British
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act), in an attempt to unify the Empire
(Baldwin 2001).
6. The British Nationality Act 1981 created four forms of subjecthood: Citizens of
the UK and Colonies, Citizens of Independent Commonwealth Countries,
Residual British subjects without citizenship, and Irish British.
7. Men make up 90% of those in immigration detention, or forcibly removed
from the UK. Three quarters of immigration detainees are African or Asian (see
Home Oﬃce Detention statistics 2016, Removals and Voluntary Departures
statistics 2016).
8. For more on the research, see project website: http://www.bris.ac.uk/policy
bristol/policy-brieﬁngs/_mixed_immigration_families/.
9. In some cases the relocation was hoped to be temporary and within the EU, in
order to access European legislation under the ‘Surinder Singh’ or Europe
route.
10. They also stressed his ‘good migrant’ status through skills, education, lan-
guages and work, presented him as ‘belonging’ to the UK, and explained his
forced unemployment and any criminal/immigration oﬀending.
11. Other variables, particularly ethnicity, religion and criminal record, would
almost certainly have arisen with diﬀerent interviewees.
12. Greatest protectionism was reserved for supposedly ‘duped’ women, who
were considered primarily British or Irish. Vulnerable but less sympathetic
were those marrying for money, whom the registrars described as usually
southern or eastern European women.
13. E.g. preferential visa categories and submission processes for the wealthy,
extortionate application fees and the weakening of family and private life
grounds for challenging deportation, in favour of the ﬁnancially-informed
concept of ‘integration’ (Griﬃths 2017b).
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